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IT HAS TO END SOMEWHERE: FEIEREISEN V. 
NEWPAGE CORP. AND THE SCOPE OF THE 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
Benjamin R. Hutchinson* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In January of 2008, Kurt Feiereisen was driving to attend a mediation meeting 
regarding his workers’ compensation claims when he was injured in a car 
accident.1  At the time, Feiereisen was pursuing three separate claims against 
Newpage Corporation for bodily injuries that he had sustained while working for 
the company during the years of 1987, 1997, and 2007.2  In June of 2008 he 
petitioned for compensation awards related to the injuries from all four occasions.3  
The hearing officer granted awards for the three earliest injuries, but denied 
compensation for the injury sustained during the car accident in 2008, claiming that 
this injury did not occur during the course of employment.4  Feiereisen appealed 
the decision of the hearing officer, and the Law Court granted review, seeking to 
address the sole question of whether “the injury resulting from a car accident that 
occurred en route to a workers’ compensation mediation arose out of and in the 
course of employment.”5  
The Law Court answered that question in the negative, and affirmed the 
decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board.6  Justice Gorman,7 writing for the 
majority, asserted that because Newpage had neither control over the risk of the car 
accident, nor responsibility over the automobile or the driving public at the time, it 
could not be held responsible for the injuries that Feiereisen sustained in the 
accident.8  There were dual rationales for arriving at this conclusion.  First, the 
majority discussed the “public streets rule”9 and the exceptions thereto,10 and 
ultimately decided that Feiereisen’s injuries from the car accident were not covered 
by any exception to the rule.11  Next, the majority debated whether the mediation 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate 2012.  The author would like to thank Professor Jennifer Wriggins for advising 
on this case note.  
 1. Feiereisen v. Newpage Corp., 2010 ME 98, ¶ 3, 5 A.3d 669. 
 2. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 
 3. Id. ¶ 4. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. ¶ 5. 
 6. Id. ¶ 13. 
 7. It is interesting to note that Justice Gorman was formerly a member of the Maine Workers’ 
Compensation Commission.  Supreme Court Justice Biographies, MAINE.GOV (2011), 
http://www.courts.state.me.us/maine_courts/supreme/justices_bios.html. 
 8. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 13, 5 A.3d 669. 
 9. Id. ¶ 7.  The public streets rule asserts that an accident occurring during travel to and from a 
place of employment and off the employer’s premises is not compensable.  Id. (citing Waycott v. 
Beneficial Corp., 400 A.2d 392, 394 (Me. 1979)).  
 10. Id. ¶ 8. 
 11. Id. ¶ 13. 
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was in the “interests of the employer”12 and ultimately decided that because 
Feiereisen’s participation in the mediation was not in the interests of the company, 
it was not part of the employment contract.13   
Justice Jabar was joined by Justice Alexander in dissent.14  The dissent focused 
on a “significant [statutory]15 change in worker’s compensation law”16 and asserted 
that travel to the mediation meeting was “incident to employment.”17  The dissent 
further argued that the statute altered the impact of prior case law upon Feiereisen’s 
situation,18 and indicated that attendance at mandatory mediation should fall within 
the scope of the employment contract.19  The dissent was reinforced by an 
exception to the public streets rule, under which it was claimed that Feiereisen’s car 
accident occurred during an “activity incident to employment.”20 
This Note begins in Part II with a discussion of the history of workers’ 
compensation in Maine, with particular focus on the scope of the employment 
contract, and then goes on to discuss the treatment of the same subjects in other 
jurisdictions.  In Part III, this Note evaluates the Feiereisen decision, with focus on 
how the Law Court determined the scope of employment under relevant legal 
principles, and how that determination affected the compensability of injuries that 
occur during travel to workers’ compensation mediation.  Part IV provides an 
analysis of the public streets rule and the exceptions thereto, and discusses why the 
employment contract should not include travel to and from mandatory mediation.  
This Note, in Part V, concludes that the majority opinion used a sound approach to 
define the scope of the employment contract for the purposes of workers’ 
compensation claims, and that an injury resulting from a car accident that occurred 
en route to a mediation meeting should not be compensable.  
II.  WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
A.  Workers’ Compensation in Maine and What Defines an Employee 
Workers’ compensation is in essence a statutorily-mandated agreement 
between the employer and employee to compromise in the event the employee 
suffers injury or disease in the course of employment21: 
                                                                                                     
 12. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. 
 13. Id. ¶ 13.  
 14. Id. (Jabar, J., dissenting).  
 15. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A. § 313 (2010) (dealing with the reciprocal obligations of employer and 
employee to attend workers’ compensation mediation).  
 16. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 19, 5 A.3d 669 (Jabar, J., dissenting).  
 17. Id. ¶ 22.  
 18. Id. ¶¶ 18-19 (citing Dorey v. Forster Mfg. Co., 591 A.2d 240 (Me. 1991)).  Dorey held that an 
injury incurred by an employee while she was retrieving records to pursue a workers’ compensation 
claim did not arise out of and in the course of employment.  Dorey, 591 A.2d at 241-42.  
 19. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 22, 5 A.3d 669 (Jabar, J., dissenting).  
 20. Id. 
 21. See Stephen W. Moriarty, Workers’ Compensation and Employer Immunity: The “Theoretical 
Superstructure” Endures, 13 ME. B. J. 290, 290 (1998).  “Stated simply, the Workers’ Compensation 
Act gives employees injured on the job an administrative remedy, without regard to fault, in exchange 
for employer immunity from civil damages for the injury.”  Id.  
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Once a workers’ compensation act has become applicable . . . it affords the 
exclusive remedy for the injury by the employee or his dependents against the 
employer and insurance carrier.  This is part of the quid pro quo in which the 
sacrifices and gains of employees and employers are to some extent put in balance, 
for, while the employer assumes a new liability without fault, he is relieved of the 
prospect of large damage verdicts.22 
The first workers’ compensation statute in Maine took effect on January 1, 1916.23  
Since that date, “employers have been immune from civil actions which otherwise 
could have been brought by employees who have sustained occupational injuries or 
diseases.”24  The exclusivity and immunity provisions of the statute “reflect a legal 
and social compromise shared with virtually all other jurisdictions in the 
country.”25  The current version of the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) in 
Maine was passed in 1992.26  
The entitlement of an injured employee to workers’ compensation does not 
come without preconditions; it is governed under an applicable section of the Act, 
which reads: “[i]f an employee . . . receives a personal injury arising out of and in 
the course of employment or is disabled by occupational disease, the employee 
must be paid compensation and furnished medical and other services by the 
employer who has assented to become subject to this Act.”27  The decision on 
whether or not an employee is entitled to workers’ compensation is by necessity a 
multi-layered analysis.  In determining the scope of activities considered to be 
within the employment contract, the words “arising out of and in the course of 
employment” are construed as having central importance.28  Prior to even 
considering whether or not an activity arose out of and in the course of 
employment, a definition of the employment contract itself must be taken into 
account. 
The scope of the employment contract is partially defined by the extent to 
which the employer consents29 to accept responsibility over the actions of an 
                                                                                                     
 22. 6 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 100.01[1] 
(2009). 
 23. Moriarty, supra note 21, at 290; see P.L. 1915, ch. 295, § 48.  
 24. Moriarty, supra note 21, at 290.  
 25. Id.  See also 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 
1.01 (2009). 
 26. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 1 (2010).  See also Maine Bureau of Insurance, An Employers’ 
Guide to Workers’ Compensation Insurance in Maine, MAINE.GOV (Dec. 15, 2011), 
http://maine.gov/pfr/insurance/consumer/workcomp.htm. 
 27. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 201(1) (2010).  The “arising out of and in the course of 
employment” language is a relic from the original Workers’ Compensation Act in Maine.  See Helen B. 
Mailman’s Case, 118 Me. 172, 180, 106 A. 606, 610 (1919). 
 28. See Standring v. Town of Skowhegan, 2005 ME 51, ¶ 11, 870 A.2d 128; Cox v. Coastal Prods. 
Co., 2001 ME 100, ¶ 8, 774 A.2d 347; Husvar v. Engineered Prods., Inc., 2000 ME 132, ¶ 5, 755 A.2d 
498; Moore v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 669 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Me. 1995); Morse v. Laverdiere’s 
Super Drug Store, 645 A.2d 613, 614 (Me. 1994); Somes v. Flint Logging, 635 A.2d 941, 942 (Me. 
1993); Comeau v. Me. Coastal Servs., 449 A.2d 362, 365-67 (Me. 1982); Nadeau v. S. Berwick, 412 
A.2d 392, 393-94 (Me. 1980); Metcalf v. Marine Colloids, Inc., 285 A.2d 367, 369 (Me. 1972).  
 29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009).  “An 
employer must consent to receive the services of an employee. Consent to accept services can be 
manifested through overt action or statement or through acquiescence.”  Id. 
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employee, and this concept is described in the doctrine of respondeat superior 
liability.30  Mere receipt of payment for services is often not enough to be 
considered an employee.31  This limitation on the scope of the employer/employee 
relationship is intended to prevent the employer from remaining vicariously liable 
for the acts of the employee over which the employer has no control.32  Thus, a 
“right-to-control” test was the early common law solution to defining the 
employment contract.33  There are seminal cases from England which influenced 
the development of this doctrine in the United States, especially with regard to its 
treatment of the differentiation between employees and independent contractors.34  
As suggested by the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law: 
Distinguishing employees from independent contractors by focusing primarily on 
the master’s right to control the “physical conduct” of employees is an 
understandable approach to setting the scope of the principal’s vicarious or 
“respondeat superior” liability.  Such enterprise liability would seem appropriately 
predicated on the principal’s ability to control potentially tortious acts of its 
agents. . . . The right-to-control test was first developed in part to protect 
consumers or purchasers from vicarious liability for the acts of service providers 
they could not control.35 
With a more developed understanding of why and how the employment contract 
must be defined, we are better equipped to investigate the scope of the contract, and 
to determine what actions do and do not arise out of and in the course of 
employment.  This determination is influenced to a large extent by the law of 
master and servant, also known as the law of agency.  In short, the terms of 
employment are those dictated by the master.36 
Since Comeau v. Maine Coastal Services37 was decided in 1982, the Law 
Court has used the same set of standards to determine whether an injury arose out 
of and in the course of employment.38  These eight factors include:  
                                                                                                     
 30. Id., reporters’ notes, cmt. a.  
 31. Id. cmt. b.  “A statute . . . may contain express exclusions from its definition of ‘employee’ for 
purposes of the statute’s coverage.  The National Labor Relations Act, for instance, excludes 
agricultural laborers, domestic servants, and supervisors, as well as independent contractors.”  Id. cmt. 
h.   
 32. Id., reporters’ notes, cmt. a. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  See, e.g., Quarman v. Burnett, (1840) 151 Eng. Rep. 509 (K.B.); 6 M. & W. 499 (involving 
a failed attempt to hold the hirer of a horse-pulled coach vicariously liable for the negligence of the 
driver); Laugher v. Pointer, (1826) 108 Eng. Rep. 204 (K.B.); 5 B. & C. 547  (same). 
 35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009). 
 36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 cmt. a (1957).   
The word ‘employment’ means the subject matter as to which the master and servant 
relation exists.  The phrase ‘scope of employment’ means the extent of this subject matter 
and denotes the field of action within which one is a servant.  The manifestations of the 
master determine what conduct may be within the scope of employment, since it includes 
only acts of the kind authorized, done within limits of time and space which approximate 
those created by the authorization.   
Id.  
 37. 449 A.2d 362 (Me. 1982). 
 38. See Feiereisen v. Newpage Corp., 2010 ME 98, ¶ 6, 5 A.3d 669; Standring v. Town of 
Skowhegan, 2005 ME 51, ¶ 11, 870 A.2d 128; Cox v. Coastal Prods. Co., 2001 ME 100, ¶ 8, 774 A.2d 
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(1) Whether at the time of the injury the employee was promoting an interest of 
the employer, or the activity of the employee directly or indirectly benefited the 
employer; (2) Whether the activities of the employee work to the benefit or 
accommodate the needs of the employer; (3) Whether the activities were within 
the terms, conditions or customs of the employment, or were acquiesced in or 
permitted by the employer; (4) Whether the activity of the employee serves both a 
business and personal purpose, or represents an insubstantial deviation from the 
employment; (5) Whether the hazard or causative condition can be viewed as 
employer or employee created; (6) Whether the actions of the employee were 
unreasonably reckless or created excessive risks or perils; (7) Whether the 
activities of the employee incidental to the employment were prohibited by the 
employer either expressly or implicitly; (8) Whether the injury occurred on the 
premises of the employer.39 
This list was cumulative when it was drawn up by the Law Court in 1982, and was 
supported by relevant Law Court decisions dating from 1921 through 1980.40  As 
such, it stands as a strong comprehensive history of workers’ compensation and 
scope of employment jurisprudence in Maine.  It should be noted that although the 
Comeau factors have often been cited by the Law Court,41 the application of the 
factors to a particular case also demands a factual inquiry into the circumstances of 
the injury as they relate to the employment situation.  As stated in Comeau, “[t]hese 
considerations as well as others do not create a dispositive checklist; rather, they 
are but factors on the scale weighing toward or against a finding that the injury 
arose out of and in the course of employment.”42  Some of the difficulties that stem 
from the phrase “[arising] out of and in the course of employment” are discussed 
below.  
B.  The Employment Contract and Workers’ Compensation in Other Jurisdictions 
The right-to-control doctrine that evolved from common law has helped to 
define the employment contract for well over a century.43  In connection with 
common law notions of agency, the doctrine finds various formulations in Supreme 
Court decisions through the latter half of the 1900s.44  Still, it is not an exclusive 
                                                                                                     
347; Husvar v. Engineered Prods., Inc., 2000 ME 132, ¶ 5, 755 A.2d 498; Moore v. Pratt & Whitney 
Aircraft, 669 A.2d 156, 158 (Me. 1995); Morse v. Laverdiere’s Super Drug Store, 645 A.2d 613, 614 
(Me. 1994); Somes v. Flint Logging, 635 A.2d 941, 942 (Me. 1993). 
 39. Comeau, 449 A.2d at 367 (internal citations omitted).  
 40. See id.  
 41. See supra note 38.  
 42. Comeau, 449 A.2d at 367. 
 43. See Sproul v. Hemmingway, 31 Mass. 1 (14 Pick.) (1833).  The owners of a vessel that was 
being towed by steamboat and damaged another vessel were not liable to the owners of the damaged 
vessel for the negligence of the steamboat operators, because the operators were neither subject to the 
control of the owners nor carrying on business for the owners’ profit at the time of the accident.  Id. at 5.  
See also Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U.S. 518, 523–24 (1889).  In Singer,the Supreme Court used the 
right-to-control test to hold a manufacturer of horse drawn wagons liable for the negligent operation of 
one of the wagons by a traveling salesperson working exclusively in the interests of the manufacturer, 
even though the manufacturer was not in physical control of the wagon.  Id.   
 44. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (interpreting, for 
purposes of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the term ‘employee’ in line with 
common law notions of agency); Creative Non–Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989) 
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standard, and other tests have been used in the courts.45  For instance, the right-to-
control test has been used in combination with an “economic realities” test in 
federal courts46 as well as state courts.47   
Virtually all jurisdictions in the country adhere to the doctrine of immunity and 
exclusivity in workers’ compensation.48  Similarly, the “arising out of and in the 
course of” language used in Maine since the state’s adoption of statutory workers’ 
compensation is paralleled in other state statutes.49  The phrase is an “axiom” of 
compensation law.50  Even so, it is “one of the most familiar and most troublesome 
concepts” in the field.51  In the words of former Supreme Court Justice Frank 
Murphy, the phrase is “deceptively simple and litigiously prolific.”52  Whether or 
not an injury arising out of and in the course of employment qualifies for 
compensation is not governed by a bright line rule; it is a case by case analysis, and 
oftentimes a muddled one.53   
It is beyond the scope of this Note to undertake a comparative analysis of 
workers’ compensation jurisprudence from all fifty states.  However, as it is 
                                                                                                     
(interpreting, for purposes of the Copyright Act of 1976, the term ‘employee’ in line with common law 
notions of agency).  
 45. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How 
It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 310 (2001) (stating “[C]ontrol over work 
was never the exclusive test of status for either respondeat superior or other statutory purposes. . . . [B]y 
the end of the nineteenth century the courts had already identified and assembled most of the other basic 
‘factors’ recognized today as evidencing one or the other type of worker status.”). 
 46. For examples of opinions that utilize a combination of the economic realities test and the 
common law test, see Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 263 (7th Cir. 2001); Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. 
Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998); Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 804-05 (10th Cir. 1989); Brock 
v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1058-59 (2d Cir. 1988); Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 
1529, 1534-35 (7th Cir. 1987).  See also, e.g., Trainor v. Apollo Metal Specialties, Inc., 318 F.3d 976, 
980 (10th Cir. 2002); Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir. 1999); Wilde v. Cnty. of 
Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105–06 (8th Cir. 1994); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 89–91 (2d Cir. 
1993); Eyerman v. Mary Kay Cosmetics, Inc., 967 F.2d 213, 218–19 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 47. See, e.g., Ark. Transit Homes, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 16 S.W.3d 545, 547–48 (Ark. 2000); 
Re/Max of N.J. v. Wausau Ins. Co., 744 A.2d 154, 157 (N.J. 2000); Whittenberg v. Graves Oil & 
Butane Co., 827 P.2d 838, 844–45 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. 
Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 403-04 (Cal. 1989); Anton v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 688 P.2d 192, 194–95 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Woody v. Waibel, 554 P.2d 492, 496 (Or. 1976). 
 48. Moriarty, supra note 22, at 290.  
 49. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-1(9) (2011); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.395(2) (2011); ARIZ. CONST. 
art. XVIII, § 8; ARKANSAS CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(4)(A) (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-40-
201(14) (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2301(4) (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.01 
(2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-1 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501(a) (West 2010).  
 50. McNamara v. Town of Hamden, 398 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Conn. 1978). 
 51. Eady v. Med. Pers. Pool, 377 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1979).  
 52. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 479 (1947).  
 53. See Herbert v. Fox & Co., [1916] 1 A.C. 405 (H.L.) 419 (appeal taken from Eng.) (noting that 
“[t]he few and seemingly simple words ‘arising out of and in the course of the employment’ have been 
the fruitful (or fruitless) source of a mass of decisions turning upon nice distinctions and supported by 
refinements so subtle as to leave the mind of the reader in a maze of confusion.  From their number 
counsel can, in most cases, cite what seems to be an authority for resolving in his favour, on whichever 
side he may be, the question in dispute.”).  See also Cudahy Packing Co. of Neb. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 
418, 424 (1923) (“Whether a given accident is so related or incident to the business must depend upon 
its own particular circumstances. No exact formula can be laid down which will automatically solve 
every case.”).  
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pertinent to the discussions in Parts I, III, IV, and V of this Note, a comparative 
analysis of some cases that involve travel to and from work related appointments is 
warranted.   This particular subset of workers’ compensation cases receives 
differing treatment depending on jurisdiction, and like so many other types of 
workers’ compensation cases, seems in large part dependent upon judicial 
interpretation of the omnipresent statutory phrase “arising out of and in the course 
of employment.”  To further focus this inquiry, only cases involving injuries 
sustained while traveling to or from an appointment related to a prior compensable 
injury will be discussed.  
As a general rule: 
[A]n injury or death occurring in the use of the public streets or highways in going 
to and returning from the place of employment generally is not compensable under 
workers’ compensation law because, in most instances, such an injury is suffered 
as a consequence of risks and hazards to which all members of the traveling public 
are subject, rather than risks and hazards having to do with and originating in the 
work or business of the employer.54 
This principle, known as the “public streets rule” or the “going and coming rule,” is 
widely accepted.55  However, a uniform application of the rule poses problems, and 
there are a number of exceptions.56  Common exceptions include: proof of a causal 
connection between employment and injury,57 employees who travel as part of their 
job,58 transportation provided by the employer,59 employer reimbursement of 
transportation expenses,60 employees on a special mission for the employer,61 and 
injuries occurring on the premises of or within the zone of employment.62  As a 
result of the many exceptions to the rule, the interpretation and inclusion of a 
particular exception will vary by jurisdiction.  Jurisdictions are even split on the 
specific question of the compensability of injuries sustained en route to receive 
medical treatment for prior compensable injuries.63  To reiterate, this is a vast and 
                                                                                                     
 54. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 269 (2003) (footnote omitted). 
 55. See id.  
 56. See id. § 272.  
 57. See, e.g., Torres v. Aulick Leasing, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 212, 218 (Neb. 2001); Rico v. All Phase 
Elec. Supply Co., 675 A.2d 406, 408 (R.I. 1996). 
 58. See 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 272 (2003). 
 59. See, e.g., Governair Corp. v. Dist. Court of Okla. Cnty., 293 P.2d 918, 920-21 (Okla. 1956). 
 60. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crawford, 339 S.E.2d 292, 294 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). 
 61. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Hyatt House, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 437 A.2d 461, 463 
(Pa. Commn. Ct. 1981). 
 62. See 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 283 (2003). 
 63. For examples of opinions holding that injuries sustained en route to medical treatment for prior 
compensable injuries do not arise out of or in the course of employment, see Dean v. Chrysler Corp., 
455 N.W.2d 699, 700 (Mich. 1990); Bankers Inv. Co. v. Boyd, 560 P.2d 958, 960-62 (Okla. 1977); 
Whitington v. Indus. Comm’n, 468 P.2d 926, 927-28 (Ariz. 1970); Kiger v. Idaho Corp., 380 P.2d 208, 
209-11 (Idaho 1963); Combined Ins. Co. v. Peoples, 428 S.E.2d 391, 391-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Hicks 
v. Spectra Physics, 843 P.2d 1009, 1010-11 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Theriot, 362 So. 2d 
1214, 1215-17 (La. Ct. App. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 376 So. 2d 950 (La. 1979); Carlson v. 
Young, 171 N.E.2d 736, 737-39 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959); Pittsburgh Hyatt House, 437 A.2d at 462-64.  
For examples of opinions holding that injuries sustained en route to medical treatment for prior 
compensable injuries do in fact arise out of or in the course of employment, see Case of McElroy, 494 
N.E.2d 1, 5 (Mass. 1986); Moreau v. Zayre Corp., 408 A.2d 1289, 1294-95 (Me. 1979); Charles N. 
2011] IT HAS TO END SOMEWHERE 333 
convoluted field of law, and there are no bright line tests readily applicable to any 
particular case, regardless of jurisdiction.64  Rather, a fact intensive inquiry is 
always necessary, and an examination of the particulars of the employment 
relationship and the circumstances surrounding the injury must be undertaken in 
order to decide whether or not the injury is compensable.65 
III.  THE FEIEREISEN DECISION 
In Feiereisen, the Law Court endeavored to resolve a single question: 
“whether the injury resulting from a car accident that occurred en route to a 
workers’ compensation mediation arose out of and in the course of employment.”66  
Kurt Feiereisen was first injured while working as a belt driver in the shipping 
department at the Newpage Corporation (formerly known as the Rumford Paper 
Mill) in 1987.67  This incident resulted in damage to his neck, mid-back, and left 
arm.68  The same injury recurred in 1997.69  After the 1997 injury, he was 
transferred to a light duty position at the company, and worked in the guardhouse at 
the Farrington Mountain Landfill station until 2007, when as a result of poor 
ergonomic conditions he sustained further gradual injury to his back.70  In 2008, 
when driving to the Lewiston Regional Office of the Workers’ Compensation 
Board to attend a mediation meeting regarding his three previous injuries, 
Feiereisen was involved in a car accident and injured his left shoulder.71  He was 
unable to work during the subsequent seven months, then resumed light duty work 
only on a periodic basis. 72  Prior to returning to work, he filed a petition for 
compensation relating to four dates of injury, including the car accident.73  The 
hearing officer at the Workers’ Compensation Board granted the petitions for the 
three injuries sustained prior to 2008, but denied the petition relating to the car 
accident because he found that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of 
                                                                                                     
Clark Assocs. v. Dependent of Robinson, 357 So. 2d 924, 929 (Miss. 1978); Immer & Co. v. Brosnahan, 
152 S.E.2d 254, 259 (Va. 1967); Thibault v. Bostrom, 134 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. 1965); Taylor v. 
Centex Constr. Co., 379 P.2d 217, 224 (Kan. 1963); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 736 S.W.2d 21, 21-23 (Ark. 
Ct. App. 1987); Fenton v. SAIF Corp., 741 P.2d 517, 520 (Ore. Ct. App. 1987); Telcon, Inc. v. 
Williams, 500 So. 2d 266, 266-68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Camp v. Lockheed Elecs., Inc., 429 A.2d 
615, 622 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Augustine v. NYS Elmira Corr. Facility, 410 N.Y.S.2d 141, 
142 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); Laines v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 122 Cal. Rptr. 139, 144 (Cal. Ct. 
App.1975).  But see 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW 
§ 10.07 (2009) (stating that most jurisdictions agree that injuries sustained when traveling to or from a 
medical appointment for a compensable work related injury are also compensable).  
 64. See Cudahy Packing Co. of Neb. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 424 (1923).  
 65. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 148 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1978); Madden v. Mountain W. Fabricators, 977 P.2d 861, 864-65 (Colo. 1999); Wiley Mfg. Co. v. 
Wilson, 373 A.2d 613, 621-22 (Md. 1977). 
 66. Feiereisen v. Newpage Corp., 2010 ME 98, ¶ 5, 5 A.3d 669. 
 67. Id. ¶ 2. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. ¶ 3. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. ¶ 4. 
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employment.74  The Law Court granted Feiereisen’s timely appeal.75   
Feiereisen argued that an exception to the “public streets” rule applied to his 
car accident.76  To support this argument, he relied on the precedent set by the Law 
Court in Moreau v. Zayre Corp., which stated that an injury sustained in a car 
accident by an employee who was driving home from medical treatment for an 
earlier compensable injury was also compensable.77  The rationale behind the 
Moreau decision was that the employer had a statutory obligation to provide 
medical services, and the employee had a reciprocal obligation to accept those 
services, so the travel to the medical appointment fell within the scope of the 
employment contract.78  Feiereisen applied this rationale to his car accident, and 
asserted that, because his participation at the mediation was mandatory, travel to 
the meeting was part of the employment contract.79  He further attempted to 
distinguish the mediation from litigation and claimed that part of the legislative 
intent behind mandatory mediation was to facilitate cooperation between the 
employer and employee in place of litigation.80 
In response, Newpage argued that the case was instead governed by Dorey v. 
Forster Manufacturing Co., which held that an injury sustained by an employee 
while she was retrieving records to pursue her workers’ compensation claim did not 
arise out of and in the course of employment and was not compensable.81  In 
Dorey, the Law Court asserted that, because the retrieval of documents was not 
done for purposes of medical treatment, but rather, to have them available at an 
“informal conference” for purposes of pursuing a claim that the employer was 
“actively contesting,” the action was not “implied into the contract of 
employment.”82  The Law Court also observed in Dorey that other jurisdictions 
have held that actions taken in furtherance of a workers’ compensation claim 
against an employer do not arise out of and in the course of employment.83 
The majority of the Law Court held in favor of Newpage and affirmed the 
decision of the hearing officer.84  Justice Gorman, writing for the majority, decided 
that an injury sustained during travel to workers’ compensation mediation did not 
arise out of and in the course of employment.85  The majority opinion gave 
                                                                                                     
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. ¶ 5. 
 76. Id. ¶¶ 8-9.  
 77. Id. (citing Moreau v. Zayre Corp., 408 A.2d 1289, 1291, 1295 (Me. 1979)).  
 78. Moreau, 408 A.2d at 1294. 
 79. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 11, 5 A.3d 669.   
 80. Id. ¶ 12.   
 81. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Dorey v. Forster Mfg. Co., 591 A.2d 240, 241 (Me. 1991)).  
 82. Dorey, 591 A.2d at 241-42. 
 83. Dorey, 591 A.2d at 242 n.1.  See Hendrickson v. George Madsen Constr. Co., 281 N.W.2d 672, 
672, 675 (Minn. 1979) (deciding that an employee’s fatal heart attack occurring shortly after testimony 
at a workers’ compensation hearing did not arise out of and in the course of employment).  See also 
Keovorabouth v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 214 P.3d 1019, 1023-24 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that 
an injury sustained by an employee when traveling to a workers’ compensation proceeding did not arise 
out of and in the course of employment); Douglas v. Spartan Mills, Startex Div., 140 S.E.2d 173, 175-
76 (S.C. 1965) (holding that an injury sustained by an employee when traveling to a workers’ 
compensation hearing was not compensable because the travel was for personal benefit). 
 84. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 13, 5 A.3d 669.   
 85. Id. ¶ 1.   
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numerous reasons for arriving at this conclusion, including that the statutory 
mandate to participate in mediation did not transform the travel thereto into part of 
the employment contract,86 that the travel served only Feiereisen’s own purpose 
and did not benefit Newpage,87 that injuries occurring at dispute resolution events 
are not covered under workers’ compensation,88 and that the accident fell within 
the “public streets rule” and fit no exception to that rule.89   
In deciding that the applicable statute90 did not go so far as to include workers’ 
compensation mediation in the employment contract, the majority was careful to 
note that although mediation was intended to make the compensation process “less 
adversarial and more flexible and realistic,” it ultimately retained its semblance to 
litigation.91  As such, travel to the meeting did not benefit or promote “the interests 
of” Newpage.92  The majority also considered the mediation hearing to be part of a 
dispute resolution system which was separate from the employment setting covered 
by workers’ compensation.93 
In the majority opinion, Justice Gorman included a brief analysis of the public 
streets rule and its exceptions.94  The essence of the rule, as stated in Waycott v. 
Beneficial Corp., is that “an accident occurring off the employer’s premises while 
an employee is merely on his way to or from his place of business is not, without 
more, compensable.”95  The rationale behind the rule is that “while outside the 
business premises and not engaged in any work-related activity an employee is not 
within the spatiotemporal boundaries of employment . . . [and] there is an 
insufficient connection with the employment context to warrant compensation for 
an injury occurring in such circumstances.”96  The majority declined to apply any 
of the exceptions to the rule,97 stating that Newpage could not have controlled or 
affected the risk of Feiereisen’s accident and had no responsibility over the 
automobile or the driving public at the time.98 
In dissent, Justice Jabar, joined by Justice Alexander, found that the statutory 
obligation to participate in mediation led to the inclusion of travel to mediation as 
part of the employment contract.99  The dissent equated the statutory duty of the 
employer to provide medical care, as described in Moreau,100 with the statutory 
duty of both the employer and employee to attend the mediation of workers’ 
compensation claims.101  This equation was drawn, in part, through the “significant 
                                                                                                     
 86. Id. ¶ 11. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. ¶ 12. 
 89. Id. ¶ 13. 
 90. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 313 (2010). 
 91. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 12, 5 A.3d 669. 
 92. Id. ¶ 13. 
 93. Id. ¶ 12. 
 94. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. 
 95. 400 A.2d 392, 394 (Me. 1979).  See also Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 7, 5 A.3d 669. 
 96. Waycott, 400 A.2d at 394.  See also Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 7, 5 A.3d 669. 
 97. See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 98. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 13, 5 A.3d 669. 
 99. Id. ¶14 (Jabar, J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. 
 101. Id. ¶ 22. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 313 (2010) (mandating that parties cooperate in 
mediation and imposing sanctions for a failure to do so).  
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relationship” exception to the public streets rule.102  Under this exception, the 
dissent noted that when there is “a significant relationship between injury and 
employment,” certain injuries sustained by an employee on the way to or from a 
place of business have been considered compensable.103  In short, the dissent 
followed Moreau by implying that an injury occurring during travel to mediation 
for a prior work related injury would also arise out of and in the course of 
employment.104 
Justice Jabar also distinguished Dorey, claiming that because title 39-A, 
section 313 of the Maine Revised Statutes was passed105 after Dorey was decided, 
deference to legislative intent should ensue.106  In other words, the dissent argued 
that the viability of Dorey was diminished by the statutory change.  The legislative 
intent behind the statute was also referenced by the dissent in order to refine the 
distinction between litigation and mediation; the dissent claimed that the 
collaborative aspects of mediation distinguished it from litigation.107  The dissent 
concluded by enumerating cases from other jurisdictions wherein compensation 
was available for injuries sustained during travel to and from work related 
activities,108 and asserted that the reciprocal obligations mandated by statute were 
“inherent in the contract of employment” and that travel to and from mandatory 
mediation fell within an exception to the public streets rule.109 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Public Streets Rule and the Exceptions Thereto 
The public streets rule is a necessary limitation on the scope of the 
employment contract for purposes of workers’ compensation.  The simple rationale 
behind the rule is that an “insufficient connection” exists between the perils that 
one encounters as a member of the traveling public and the risks that one incurs 
when engaging in work-related activities to justify compensating employees for 
injuries that arise during travel to and from work.110  To reiterate, the principle was 
nicely illustrated in Waycott and restated in Feiereisen: “an accident occurring off 
the employer’s premises while an employee is merely on his way to or from his 
place of business is not, without more, compensable.”111  The phrase “without 
                                                                                                     
 102. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 15, 5 A.3d 669 (Jabar, J., dissenting) (quoting Waycott v. Beneficial 
Corp., 400 A.2d 392, 394 (Me. 1979)). 
 103. Id. (quoting Waycott, 400 A.2d at 394).  
 104. Id. ¶ 16.   
 105. Section 313 was enacted as part of a change in the Workers’ Compensation law following the 
recommendations of a Blue Ribbon Commission, effective Jan. 1, 1993.  Id. ¶ 19. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. ¶ 20. 
 108. Id. ¶ 21.  The dissent cited the following cases: Turner v. Indus. Claim App. Office, 111 P.3d 
534, 537-38 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (involving travel from a vocational evaluation); American Mfrs. Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 642 N.W.2d 584, 590-91 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (involving travel to medical 
evaluation); Woodrum v. Premier Auto Glass Co., 660 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) 
(involving travel from a medical examination).  
 109. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 22, 5 A.3d 669 (Jabar, J., dissenting).   
 110. Waycott v. Beneficial Corp., 400 A.2d 392, 394 (Me. 1979).   
 111. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 7, 5 A.3d 669 (quoting Waycott, 400 A.2d at 394). 
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more” suggests that the nuances and idiosyncrasies of the doctrine are all contained 
in its exceptions.  
The Feiereisen Court stated that when a “sufficient connection” existed 
between employment and employee travel, that exceptions to the rule were 
recognized.112  The opinion then listed a number of recognized exceptions,113 but 
isolated the one announced in Moreau114 as central to Feiereisen’s argument.  
Despite the fact that the employee in Moreau was driving to a medical appointment 
regarding a prior injury for which she had not yet filed a petition, the Law Court 
held that the compensability of the prior injury was a determining factor, and that 
the statutory obligation of the employer to provide and the employee to receive 
medical treatment was part of the employment contract.115  The major and obvious 
difference between Moreau and Feiereisen is the purpose behind the travel that 
gave rise to the injury.  The medical purpose of the appellant’s travel in Moreau 
was deemed within the scope of the employment contract, and the mediation 
purpose of the appellant’s travel in Feiereisen was not.116  In neither context did the 
employer control the risk of the accident; it is implied that there is something 
essentially different between medical treatment and mediation. 
The Law Court in Feiereisen recognized that the legislative intent behind 
mandatory mediation under 39-A M.R.S. § 313 was to promote collaboration and 
replace litigation whenever possible, but ultimately decided that mediation retained 
enough litigation-like qualities to preclude it from being covered under a workers’ 
compensation scheme.117  It is interesting to note that when the Law Court made 
the distinction that “injuries occurring during attendance at dispute resolution 
events are not compensable,”118 it diverged from a discussion of the public streets 
rule.  If this distinction is applied to Moreau, it should follow that had the injury in 
Moreau occurred at the doctor’s office instead of on the way home from the office, 
it would also have been compensable.119  This is to say, that a doctor’s office is 
                                                                                                     
 112. Id. ¶ 8. 
 113. Id.  See, e.g., Cox v. Coastal Prods. Co., 2001 ME 100, ¶ 10, 774 A.2d 347 (applying a “dual 
purpose” exception to a trip that served both business and private purposes); Abshire v. City of 
Rockland, 388 A.2d 512, 514-15 (Me. 1978) (applying a “special errand” exception to travel undertaken 
at the request of the employer); Oliver v. Wyandotte Indus. Corp., 308 A.2d 860, 863 (Me. 1973) 
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entered the public way); Brown v. Palmer Constr. Co., 295 A.2d 263, 267 (Me. 1972) (applying a 
“traveling employee” exception to injuries that arise from the necessity of sleeping and eating away 
from home). 
 114. Moreau v. Zayre Corp., 408 A.2d 1289 (Me. 1979). 
 115. Id. at 1291, 1294.  See also ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 206 (2010) (relating to the duties and 
rights of parties as to medical and other services). 
 116. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 13, 5 A.3d 669. 
 117. Id. ¶ 12. 
 118. Id. (emphasis added). 
 119. The questions then arise: would the employer or the doctor’s office be responsible for the 
injury?  Did the injury occur in the parking lot, the waiting area, or the examination room?  As one can 
imagine, this situation might implicate medical malpractice insurance as well.  It is easy to get carried 
away with such a hypothetical, but the point is that when dealing with workers’ compensation, as 
suggested by the title of this Note, “it has to end somewhere.”  The use of the word “at” by the Law 
Court may have been inadvertent, but it does raise further questions, many of which are beyond the 
scope of this Note.   
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sufficiently connected to employment to fall within the employment contract, but 
that a dispute resolution event is not.  The implicit logic behind this divergence is 
that the statutory obligation of the employer to provide and the employee to submit 
to medical treatment is in the interests of the employer, but that the statutory 
obligation of both employer and employee to appear at the mediation of an active 
workers’ compensation claim against the employer is not in the interests of the 
employer.  
The Feiereisen decision hinged upon the interests of the employer: because 
Feiereisen’s action of driving to the mediation hearing did not promote the interests 
of Newpage, no exception to the public streets rule was implicated.120  Once 
Moreau was implicitly distinguished, the case fell neatly within the ambit of the 
proscriptive rule, and the potential expansion of the employment contract was 
curtailed as in Dorey.121  To quote the Law Court: “Feiereisen’s travel that day 
served only his own purpose: to proceed with his claim for benefits by participating 
in the current-day equivalent of Dorey’s informal conference, i.e., a mediation 
session.  It did not ‘benefit’ Newpage any more than his attendance at a hearing 
would benefit Newpage.”122  Thus, by relying upon the relative simplicity of the 
public streets rule itself, the Law Court was able to avert the complications of 
statutory interpretation that were raised by the dissent.  
B.  Why the Employment Contract Should Not Be Extended to Include Travel to 
and From Mandatory Mediation 
There is a strong public interest in limiting the scope of the employment 
contract to activities that are undertaken in the interest of the employer.  Without 
this limitation, the incentive for an employer to retain employees would diminish in 
proportion to the increased scope of employment.  One can easily imagine that the 
ordinary course of business in the marketplace would become unmanageable if an 
employer were responsible for all acts and injuries of an employee as he or she 
pursued interests outside of work.  
While the majority opinion drew a clear boundary to the scope of the 
employment contract, the dissent pushed the limits of this scope, spurred on by the 
legislative impetus behind title 39-A, section 313 of the Maine Revised Statutes.123  
                                                                                                     
 120. Id. ¶ 13. 
 121. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.   
 122. Id. ¶ 11.   
 123. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 313 (2010) (providing, in part: “The mediator shall by informal 
means, which may include telephone contact, determine the nature and extent of the controversy and 
attempt to resolve it. The mediator . . . may require that the parties appear and submit relevant 
information. . . . The parties shall cooperate with the mediator assigned to the case. The assigned 
mediator shall report to the board the failure of a party to cooperate or to produce requested material. 
The board may impose sanctions against a party who does not cooperate or produce requested materials, 
including the following: A. Assessment of costs and attorney’s fees; B. Reductions of attorney’s fees; or 
C. If the party is the moving party, suspension of proceedings until the party has cooperated or produced 
the requested material. . . . The employer or representative of the employee, employer or insurer who 
participates in mediation must be familiar with the employee’s claim and has authority to make 
decisions regarding the claim. The board may assess a forfeiture in the amount of $100 against any 
employer or representative of the employee, employer or insurer who participates in mediation without 
full authority to make decisions regarding the claim. If a representative of the employer, insurer or 
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The dissent initially distinguished Moreau from Dorey,124 but then implied that the 
two cases were analogized by the enactment of the statute,125 which Justice Jabar 
claimed made a “significant change in the workers’ compensation law.”126  This 
change, according to the dissent, made mediation, as a cooperative process 
supported by possible sanctions against non-cooperation, “distinctly different from 
other stages of litigation.”127  Based upon this interpretation of the statute, the 
dissent viewed the mediation as within the scope of the employment contract, as 
was the medical treatment in Moreau, and stated that travel to mediation fell within 
an exception to the public streets rule.128  In other words, the dissent suggested that 
section 313 nullified the majority’s reliance on prior case law, by reasoning that the 
mandatory mediation imposed by the statute should not be equated to the informal 
conference in Dorey.129   
Under a customary understanding of the agency relationship, section 313 does 
not alter the interests of the employer as is suggested by the dissent.  Thus, the 
“interests” of the employer are not implicated by mandatory participation in 
mediation.130  Even though non-participation may bring monetary sanctions, and 
the employer will be responsible for paying the costs of treating the employee’s 
injury if the employee prevails, the mediation itself is not in furtherance of the 
employment enterprise as a going concern.  It is not the exclusive interests of the 
employer and employee that are at stake during mediation: a public policy interest 
in favor of mediation, contrived by the Legislature, is also involved.  Is the 
employer forced to accept the Legislature’s notion of what is and what is not in his 
or her best interests as an employer?  A much broader debate emerges as a result of 
such questions, and implicates the tension between the principle of freedom of 
contract and governmental regulation of business.  The debate over the respective 
strengths and weaknesses of these often conflicting forces is beyond the scope of 
this Note.   
Regardless, the section of the statute which mandates that the parties cooperate 
in mediation and imposes sanctions for noncompliance mentions nothing of the 
employment contract.131   A mere mandate to cooperate at a dispute resolution 
event does not, in the words of the majority, “transform Feiereisen’s attendance at 
mediation into an obligation that is reciprocal to any employer action or 
                                                                                                     
employee participates in mediation or any other proceeding of the board, the representative shall notify 
the employer, insurer or employee of all actions by the representative on behalf of the employer, insurer 
or employee and any other actions at the proceeding.”).   
 124. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶¶ 16-18, 5 A.3d 669 (Jabar, J., dissenting). 
 125. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 313 (2010).   
 126. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 19, 5 A.3d 669 (Jabar, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. ¶ 20. 
 128. Id. ¶ 22. 
 129. Id. ¶ 19.  See id. ¶¶ 10-11, 5 A.3d at 673-74. 
 130. The majority and dissent may have differing conceptions of what the word ‘interest’ means in 
this instance. Compare id. ¶ 11 (majority opinion) (adopting a meaning that is more akin to “benefit”), 
with id. ¶¶ 18-20 (Jabar, J., dissenting) (contrasting the notion of a selfish benefit to either party, as 
presented by the majority, with a more neutral concept that applies to the collective well being of both 
parties (as they pursue a legislatively coerced reconciliation)).  
 131. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 313(4) (2010).  
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obligation.”132  In the event of statutory ambiguity, it is inappropriate to project 
onto the law an implication about the scope of the employment contract, especially 
when the only recognized legislative intent was to “encourage mediation.”133  The 
two policy interests at stake here, the policy of not unduly broadening the scope of 
employer liability and the policy of encouraging mediation of compensation 
claims, are not necessarily competing.  If the statute is taken at face value, there is 
no reason why both policies cannot work in harmony.  Mediation can be 
encouraged, and, for purposes of workers’ compensation claims, be considered 
outside the scope of the employment contract.  The words of the statute do nothing 
to either confirm or dispel this possibility. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Though the enactment of section 313 arguably does create a legal difference 
between mandatory mediation and informal mediation conferences, the scope of 
the employment contract for purposes of workers’ compensation is not necessarily 
impacted by the change, and it seems clear that in this case the majority made the 
correct decision.  From a policy perspective, and given Feiereisen’s twenty year 
history with work related injuries,134 it was entirely prudent to prevent the 
expansion of the employment contract into arenas wherein the employee was acting 
outside of the interests of the employer.   
The majority drew a rather strict line on this matter, whereas the dissent looked 
to the statute for guidance.  But by reading too deeply into the purposes behind the 
legislation, the dissent created an extension of the employment contract where none 
was warranted.  The broad consent of the employer to participate in a workers’ 
compensation program should not extend the scope of the employment contract to 
include such unforeseen particularities as the travel of the employee to a mandatory 
mediation meeting.  
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the employer is held liable for the 
actions of the employee when the employee is acting within the scope of his or her 
duty to the employer.135  Therefore, when the employee is working in the interest of 
and furthering the goals of the employer, the employer retains an obligation of 
responsibility over the actions of the employee, and also, as pertinent to workers’ 
compensation, over the safety of the employee.  When the employee acts beyond 
the scope of employment, the employer is not liable for his or her actions or safety.  
                                                                                                     
 132. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 11, 5 A.3d 669.   
 133. Id. ¶ 19 (Jabar, J., dissenting). 
 134. Though there may not be any factual support for the notion that Feiereisen was malingering, the 
mere duration and repetition of his petitions for workers’ compensation may have been a further and 
unstated rationale for the Law Court to limit the scope of his employment contract with Newpage.  For 
statutory authority relating to another possible unstated rationale of the Law Court, the possibility of 
double recovery under automobile liability insurance and workers’ compensation, see generally ME. 
REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 107 (2010) (stating that the employee must repay to the employer the value of 
any compensation paid which is subsequently recovered from the third party liable for the injury).  The 
Law Court did not address the issue of whether the January 2008 car accident was a result Feiereisen’s 
own negligence, whether he was injured by the negligence of a third party tortfeasor, or whether the 
accident involved contributory negligence on the part of both parties.  See generally, Feiereisen, 2010 
ME 98, 5 A.3d 669.   
 135. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No.2, 2009). 
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The “interests of the employer” standard helps to draw a clear line between an 
employee getting paid to work for an employer, and an employee seeking payment 
when he or she is injured during employment.  When an employee brings a 
workers’ compensation claim against his or her employer, it seems inappropriate to 
claim that he or she is working in the service of the employer.  This determination 
should be quite straightforward: if the employer is contesting the claim, then the 
employee is not acting in the service of the employer by attending a mediation 
hearing.  The employee nearly rises to the level of an adverse party in such 
instances, and should no longer be considered to be under the control of the 
employer.  The reciprocity requirement imposed by statute is a mutual obligation 
similar to that guaranteed by contract, but more closely resembling the compulsion 
to show up in court before an adverse party.  The statute is not geared toward 
preserving the employment relationship at the time of mediation, but rather, toward 
preserving the just and orderly pursuit of the mediation itself, and in doing so, 
requiring that both parties to the action participate.  The employer does not give 
voluntary consent to authorize the actions of the employee at this point, but is 
required by statute to relinquish the “right to control.”  Arguably, it is the 
Legislature, and not the employer, that exercises the “right to control” at this 
juncture.  The statute may actually deprive the employer of the ability to consent to 
mediation, thus driving the mediation outside the scope of the employment 
contract.  It is unjust to fuse an independent consent to mediation with the statutory 
obligation to concede to mediation. 
Fulfilling an obligation and fulfilling an obligation under a contract can be one 
and the same thing.  They can also, as in this case, be different things.  If viewed 
independently of the prior employment relationship, the obligation to participate in 
mediation lacks consideration for the employer.  This is to say, that the employer 
receives nothing in return for attending mediation, other than the prospect of 
avoiding litigation and possibly relieving the company of an outstanding 
compensation claim.  The agreement to immunity under workers’ compensation 
law, that is, the agreement that the employee may not sue the employer for injuries 
sustained during employment, is not sufficient consideration to extend the scope of 
the employment contract so far beyond the benefit which the employer receives 
from his or her business as a going concern.  The mediation is a mere remedial 
measure, not an ex post facto extension of employment.  In order to retain the idea 
that employer and employee work together to further the interests of a single 
enterprise, the limits of the employment contract must be drawn to exclude such a 
quasi-adversarial proceeding as mandatory mediation, and clearly must exclude the 
travel to and from such an event. 
       
